NATO has issued a stark warning about a surge in state-linked cyberattacks targeting Europe’s civilian maritime ports, underscoring growing vulnerabilities at the intersection of global trade and defense logistics.
In a newly released policy brief, the NATO Cooperative Cyber Defence Centre of Excellence (CCDCOE) points to a clear and rising trend: ports across Europe are being systematically targeted by cyber actors tied to Russia, China, and Iran. The brief, titled “Addressing State-Linked Cyber Threats to Critical Maritime Port Infrastructure”, highlights how attacks have grown more sophisticated, more frequent, and more strategically aligned with geopolitical tensions.
Nearly every NATO member and partner surveyed reported serious cyber incidents against port infrastructure within the last five years. The most vulnerable systems? Access control technologies and vessel traffic management. Disabling either can cripple commercial port operations—and NATO’s own military logistics in a conflict scenario.
Hacktivist groups like NoName057 have taken center stage in these campaigns. This pro-Russian collective, often acting in coordination with other groups such as Z-Pentest and People’s Cyber Army, has launched distributed denial-of-service (DDoS) attacks on ports in Rotterdam, Felixstowe, and Gdynia. While not technically state actors, their goals are often aligned with Kremlin strategies.
The CCDCOE also raised red flags over the ambiguity between state-sponsored advanced persistent threats (APTs) and financially motivated cybercriminals. These groups often use similar tactics—ransomware, phishing, malware, and data breaches—making attribution difficult. In one notable case from early 2022, ransomware attacks hit 17 major oil terminals in Belgium, the Netherlands, and Germany. Ports including Hamburg, Antwerp-Zeebrugge, and Rotterdam saw operations disrupted, product rerouted, and suppliers left scrambling. Investigators linked the attack to the Russian-affiliated BlackCat group.
But Russia isn’t acting alone. Iranian APTs linked to the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) and Ministry of Intelligence and Security (MOIS) have coordinated campaigns targeting strategic ports in the Eastern Mediterranean, including Israel’s Haifa and Ashdod. These attacks have gone beyond data theft—they’ve aimed to destabilize trade flows and project influence across the region.
China is also deploying cyber capabilities with strategic intent. A campaign codenamed ArcaneDoor, uncovered by Cisco Talos, used tailored malware to infiltrate coastal and financial networks in geopolitically sensitive nations. The Mustang Panda group, affiliated with Chinese intelligence, has repeatedly targeted maritime transport firms via malware-laced USB drives and phishing emails.
The brief calls out a major flaw in NATO’s current posture: its 2011 Alliance Maritime Strategy doesn’t address cyber threats. That strategy, written before the surge of hybrid warfare and digital infrastructure integration, lacks guidance for cooperation with private port operators, who own most of Europe’s port assets.
This civil-military divide is now a critical vulnerability. Commercial port owners rarely have formal mechanisms to coordinate with NATO on cybersecurity. Intelligence sharing remains fragmented, incident response unstandardized, and exercises underfunded. Attackers exploit these gaps.
Despite voluntary guidelines like those from the International Association of Ports and Harbors, implementation remains inconsistent. Many ports still lack the tools, staffing, and funding to handle complex, coordinated cyberattacks—especially those backed by state resources.
NATO’s CCDCOE recommends immediate action. First, the alliance must update its maritime strategy to include cybersecurity as a core element. This means integrating civilian infrastructure into NATO defense planning, with clear protocols for joint response.
Second, a sector-specific threat intelligence-sharing platform is needed—something akin to NORMA Cyber in the Nordics, or the NMIO Global Maritime Community of Interest. NATO should also appoint dedicated cybersecurity liaisons between Maritime Command (MARCOM) and national port authorities.
Third, exercises like Locked Shields should expand to include port operators and simulate cross-sector attacks. The brief also pushes for working groups under the International Maritime Organization (IMO) to standardize cyber protocols across NATO and partner nations.
The stakes are high. Ports support around 80% of Europe’s international trade and serve as the logistical lifeline for NATO operations. Disrupting them doesn’t just hurt business—it slows down military deployments, hampers humanitarian relief, and creates psychological instability.
Recorded Future recently warned that Russian hybrid threats could spike before the 2025 NATO Summit. Cyberattacks, sabotage, and other gray zone tactics may escalate if the alliance strengthens its position on Ukraine or Eastern Europe. NATO’s brief stresses that cyberattacks are no longer confined to servers—they now reach into cargo holds, port gates, and defense supply chains.
Without urgent updates to strategy and coordination mechanisms, Europe’s ports remain exposed—digital beachheads in a growing arena of hybrid conflict.
